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This paper uses farmers’ responses to exogenous weather shocks in South Africa’s Limpopo River Basin 
to gauge how farmers are apt to respond to future climate change-induced shocks, in particular drought. 
Droughts are expected to increase in both frequency and intensity as a result of climate change. This study 
examines the costs of drought today and who it affects the most, in an effort to guide policy adaptations in 
the future. A combination of descriptive statistics and econometric analysis is used to approximate the 
potential impact of droughts on rural South African households. This paper also estimates household 
vulnerability. After controlling for household heterogeneity using propensity score matching, it is noted 
that there is no statistically significant impact of droughts on income, thus suggesting households have 
already adapted to living in a drought-prone environment. The types of households that were more 
vulnerable to climate shocks are analyzed using two measures of vulnerability: the probability of falling 
below income of 7,800 South African Rand (R), and the probability of income falling below 16,000 R. 
Residents of the Limpopo province were the least vulnerable under both metrics. Setswana and SeSwati 
households were more vulnerable than other ethnic groups. Households that do not own livestock and 
households that rely on rainfed agriculture were also more vulnerable than other households.  
Keywords: vulnerability, climate change, drought, South Africa 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is expected to exacerbate Africa’s struggles with strained water resources and food 
security. Rising global temperatures are expected to increase flooding in coastal areas, cause declines in 
agricultural production, threaten biodiversity and the productivity of natural resources, increase the range 
of vector-borne and waterborne diseases, and exacerbate desertification; thus, they have a 
disproportionately adverse impact on Africa’s agriculture-based economy (Mendelsohn et al. 2000). To 
make matters worse, Africa has a low adaptive capacity due to its dependence on rainfed agriculture, low 
levels of human and physical capital, and poor infrastructure. Of the first wave of studies on the effects of 
climate change on economic variables, most estimated the predicted loss of income from climate change 
through crop simulation experiments (see, for example; Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994). The next 
generation of studies—Ricardian studies (such as by Mendelsohn and Dinar, 1994; 2003) and hedonic 
studies (such as by Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007)—sought to capture adaptations to climate change 
by exploiting cross-sectional variance in climate and land prices. However, looking at how land rents 
change with climate misses an important part of the impact of climate change. Climate change is expected 
to cause an increase in drastic weather events and this, in combination with households employing costly 
risk-coping strategies, is likely to increase the probability of income shocks having an even larger impact 
on the poor. For this reason, studying the impact on expected incomes is not enough: it is important to 
keep in mind the stochastic nature of poverty to understand how a changing distribution of risk will lead 
to increased vulnerability, not just decreased expected income.  
By analyzing today’s responses to natural disaster shocks in Ethiopia and South Africa, this paper 
which is part of a larger project aimed at studying and characterizing vulnerability seeks to better 
understand these issues in order to implement policy options for adaptation to climate change. Using data 
from a 2005 survey of just under 800 households, this paper focuses on South African households’ 
characteristics, farm production, and response to shocks as well as perceptions of climate change in the 
Limpopo River Basin.  
Farmers’ responses to droughts of today are used to estimate the impact of climate change-
induced droughts and study vulnerability in the region. This paper does not examine the impact of floods, 
hailstorms or fire outbreaks; the data on these other climate-related shocks were insufficient and therefore 
could not lead to a meaningful analysis. This paper explored the thesis that an increase in the frequency 
and severity of droughts (as well as floods, hailstorms and fire outbreaks) will induce a change in 
behavior to mitigate the risk from this new shock distribution, that this change is measurable and that it 
can be approximated with the response to shocks today. It is difficult to predict exactly what this behavior 
will be, and exactly how it will impact welfare, but coping strategies used in response to shocks today do 
convey information on how rural South Africans will cope in the future. The types of climate-related 
shocks examined in this study are primarily droughts. This study examines the cost of droughts through 
propensity score matching, a statistical method that corrects for selection bias. Lastly, the vulnerability of 
individual households is calculated, and vulnerabilities across groups are compared, in order to gain 
insights into what the characteristics of households are that lead them to be more vulnerable to shocks of 
various kinds.  
Background 
Climate change is expected to bring changing rainfall patterns with resulting changes in agriculture, food 
security and economic growth; increased temperatures; increases in the prevalence of vector-borne 
diseases; decreased water security; sea level rise; and increased variability of floods and droughts (DFID, 
2004). Increased temperatures will bring potentially faster plant growth, but also shorter growing seasons 
and increased stress to livestock production. No precise information is available about the future impacts 
of these changes in terms of the exact changes in the distribution of temperature, floods, droughts or their 





increased rainfall variability will bring simultaneously more floods and more droughts (DFID, 2004). 
Indeed, farmers are aware of many of these impacts (Challinor et al. 2007).  
One way to understand the impacts of climate change is to look at land values, since the future 
productivity of the land as a function of climate, soil, distance to market, and so forth is embodied in the 
price of the land. Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) adopt this approach in some of their recent work. 
Their methods were not employed in this paper due to data constraints and the scale and focus of this 
project, they are not appropriate for studying poverty in rural South Africa. Information on the price of 
agricultural land does not exist for a hedonic study such as in Deschenes and Greenstone (2007). While 
estimating production functions may have been useful, the survey did not provide reliable data on 
production inputs. Neither of these methods also tells us anything about the fluctuations in income that 
may be particularly important in a developing-country context. Instead, information about wealth, income 
and climate change-induced shocks is used to estimate future vulnerability to climate change. The 
analysis will not result in a point estimate of the impact of climate change, but instead will call attention 
to particularly vulnerable groups and obtain rough approximations of climate change’s potential impact.  
Vulnerability to climate change means different things to different people. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change describes vulnerability as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or 
unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including increased variability and downside risk 
(IPCC 2001). Geographers refer to vulnerability as what Leichenko and O’Brien have defined as “the 
extent to which environmental and economic changes impact the capacity of regions, sectors, ecosystems, 
and social groups to respond to various types of natural and socioeconomic shocks” (Leichenko and 
O’Brien 2002). Economists, who study the stochastic aspects of poverty, see vulnerability as an ex-ante 
measure of well-being, reflecting the prospects a household faces in the future (Skoufias and Quisumbing 
2008; Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007; Chaudhuri 2003; Heitzmann et al. 2002; Dercon 2001; Holzmann and 
Jorgensen 2000; and Moser 1998). All of these definitions convey vulnerability as having two 
components: i) an exposure to risk; and ii) a low capacity to cope with adverse outcomes. In many ways, 
it is impossible to separate either risk or adaptive capacity as cause or effect because the presence of risk 
may induce costly risk-averse behavior, whereas the absence of a safety net may induce greater exposure 
to risk.  
In general, economists have found that vulnerable households tend to be those with low levels of 
human capital and poor access to information, limited access to credit and risk-management instruments, 
and few productive and financial assets. Vulnerable households tend to suffer from physical and 
psychological disabilities, social exclusion and inadequate social support networks. They tend to live in 
harsh agroclimatic environments with limited natural resources, and as part of communities with little 
entrepreneurial activity. Their work tends to be in sectors that are particularly sensitive to macroeconomic 
volatility and sectoral shocks (Chaudhuri 2003). Figure 1 was adapted from Chaudhuri (2003) and 
presents these linkages schematically. A vulnerability assessment will determine which of these linkages 
are most important in a particular setting. With the kind of large, uncertain shocks to food and water 
security that climate change is likely to bring, being able to address vulnerability becomes a useful tool in 
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Vulnerability is important because an efficient social policy seeks to go beyond poverty 
alleviation in the present, and examine poverty prevention in the future. A poverty reduction strategy that 
ignores the transient nature of poverty misses households that have a high probability of being poor and 
may instead devote scarce resources to households that are only transiently poor and would have found a 
way out of poverty without government assistance.  
This paper uses vulnerability as expected poverty (VER), the probability of falling below some 
welfare threshold (becoming poor), conditional on the occurrence of an exogenous shock, ( | )i iP z z X<  
where iz is expected welfare; z is a welfare threshold level; and iX  is a vector of household 
characteristics and shocks. This definition takes into account the risk a household may face, as well as the 
capacity of the household to adapt to adverse outcomes. VER is flawed in that it is not always consistent 
with ideas about risk aversion and does not differentiate between poverty and extreme poverty. Other 
economic definitions of vulnerability overcome these issues, such as vulnerability as expected low utility, 
and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003a). These are 
refinements of VER, but they are more complicated to use and less intuitive for policymakers.  
Poverty is defined as a low level of income, because it is an intuitive definition, and because we 
believe income is more accurately measured in the data than consumption is. Vulnerability can also be 
defined as the probability of losing the means of production, the probability of poor nutrition in the future, 
or the probability of children dropping out of school; hence, sustaining gaps in human capital formation, 
but none of these measures was available in the data. While income, in contrast to consumption, is a 
flawed measure of current welfare, it is the best measure of welfare in this dataset. 
Vulnerability to climate change is defined as “expected poverty;” that is, the probability of falling 
below an income threshold as a result of climate change. The type of vulnerability of interest in this paper 
is vulnerability to the increased number of droughts and floods climate change is expected to bring. 
Estimating vulnerability to climate change is difficult since it requires making predictions about the 





about the future path of carbon dioxide (CO2) and different physics models create very different 
predictions about what will happen to physical properties of the atmosphere. In addition, the scale of 
climate change models is not always appropriate for study of economic effects. Scaling down to predict 
local conditions compounds this uncertainty and faces computing power limitations (Challinor et al. 2007, 
ILRI 2006, Coppola and Giorgi, 2005, and Arnell et al. 2003).  
The measurement of vulnerability should give a static picture of the costs of climate change. 
There will be short-run adaptations to individual shocks, but also long-run adaptations to a changing 
distribution of shocks. The data only allow us to measure the short-run adaptations, but are nonetheless an 
important analytical tool used to identify risks and vulnerable groups, assess the outcome and impact of 






2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA  
The data come from a survey of approximately 800 farmers in 20 districts of South Africa’s Limpopo 
River Basin, which was part of a project jointly sponsored by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and the Center for Environmental Economics & Policy in Africa (CEEPA). The project 
is entitled “Food and Water Security under Global Change: Developing Adaptive Capacity with a Focus 
on Rural Africa.” The distribution of observations by village and by farm type is reported in Table 1. The 
location of farms can be seen in Figure 2. The questionnaire had nine sections: i) a household roster with 
demographic information (Figure 2); ii) a household assets section which included information about 
basic services, diseases and shocks; iii) a section on land tenure and farm value; iv) a section on farm 
machinery, farm buildings, wells, pumps, and wage rates; v) a section on crop production for both annual 
and perennial crops; vi) a section on livestock production; vii) a section on access to extension, markets 
and credit; viii) a section on food expenditures and income; and ix) a section on climate change 
perceptions and adaptation options.  
Table 1. Sampled households by village and farm type 
District Frequency Percentage of sample 
Bronkhorstspruit 29 3.9 
Cullinan 5 0.7 
Krugersdorp 13 1.7 
Carolina 31 4.1 
Lydenburg 36 4.8 
Middelburg 49 6.5 
Nkomazi 25 3.3 
Witrivier 43 5.7 
Brits 25 3.3 
Marico 49 6.5 
Rustenburg 26 3.5 
Lephalale (Ellisras) 61 8.1 
Tzaneen (Letaba) 45 6.0 
Messina 48 6.4 
Nebo 39 5.2 
Makpopane (Potgietersrus)  55 7.3 
Soutpansberg 65 8.7 
Thabazimbi 30 4.0 
Thohoyandou 49 6.5 
Warmbad (Bela-Bela) 28 3.7 
Total 751 100 
Type of farm   
Small-scale 689 92.5 
Large-scale 56 7.5 






Figure 2. The Limpopo River Basin with district boundaries and household locations 
 
Source: Created by Author using data from Food and Water Security under Global Change: 
 
Table 2. Household demographic information 
Variable  Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
Obs 
Household size 6.2 1 24 2.9 727 
Years of education* 9.5 0 34 5.1 746 
Ethnic Group Number of households Percentage of sample 
     Zulu 15 2  
     Xhosa 18 2  
     Tshivenda 125 17  
     Southern Sotho 11 1  
     Shangaan/Tsonga 70 9  
     SeTswana 146 20  
     SeSwati 73 10  
     Sepedi/ N Sotho 194 26  





Table 2. Continued 
Ethnic Group Number of households Percentage of sample 
     English 4 0.5  
     Afrikaans 25 3  
     Other 2 0.3  
Households with access to landline 709 95 
 
Households with access to electricity 143 19  
Households that obtained a loan 166 22  
Households that did not obtain a loan 
because they did not have access to or 
information about credit 
203 41  
Households that did not want a loan 160 32  
Households that own livestock, poultry, 
fish or other farm animals 
324 58.8  
Note: It was not clear from the survey who was the household head. “Years of education” refers to the educational level of the 
most educated household member as is typically done. 
Households reported having from 1 to 24 individuals, but the household roster only had 
information for 15 members. Information was gathered on the age, gender, and educational level of all 
household members as well as about the jobs and salaries of each individual, as discussed below. Wealth 
is measured by household assets and farm value. Households were asked if they owned various assets, 
such as a television, radio, flush toilet, cell phone, house made of stone/concrete or brick, refrigerator, 
irrigation system or a car (Table 3). If they did not own any of these, they were also asked if they owned a 
bicycle, hand-drawn cart or a set of iron cooking pans. Households were also asked how many of each 
item they owned as well as either the replacement cost or year purchased and original price. To calculate 
farm value, households were asked about the area, use, soil type, fertility, slope, erosion, water source, 
title status, and value (when known) of the land they owned or rented.  
Table 3. Household asset information used to create a wealth factor score 
Percent of people owning a: 
Television 75.0 
Radio 87.0 
Flush Toilet 27.6 
Cell Phone 77.8 





Source: Author’s Calculations from Food and Water Security under Global Change: Developing Adaptive  





Questions about income were asked multiple times in the survey. In various parts of the survey 
modules, there are questions about the derivation of income from specific sources, such as whether the 
income is from employment, crop sales or livestock sales. Section 8 of the survey had a separate income 
module where questions about income from employment, crops, and livestock as well as gifts and 
remittances were asked (Table 4). The data on income from crop and livestock sales were unusable; thus, 
only information on crops and livestock from the final module was used. Data on income sources from 
work were more reliable as they were broken down by person and job. Many observations on the quantity 
of income received from each job were missing. Because ignoring missing data can lead to biased results, 
income by job source was imputed using information on gender, education and type of job, using the 
multiple imputation algorithm known as “Amelia,” which was developed by Gary King and described in 
Honaker et al. (1999). This figure was then aggregated by person and by household to calculate a figure 
on total household income from employment. These results are reported as imputed labor income in Table 
4. Note that the totals in Table 4 are not necessarily consistent with the columns and number of 
households reporting income from a source. While some households reported receiving income from a 
source, they did not list the amount of income received. In this case, the household was counted as a 
missing observation in calculating the mean and standard deviation of income from that source, but still 
listed as a household reporting income from that source.  In calculating total income, the unreported 
income was included as a zero. This is why three households report receiving income from selling 
nonfarm assets, but there is only one observation for the amount of income from selling non-farm assets. 
Table 4. Sources of income (April 2004–2005) 
Type of income Households 
reporting income 
from this source 
Income obtained (in S.A. Rand) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total nonfarm net income (labor and selling 
items) 
245 42,649 82,653 150 979,200 
Gifts 20 11,929 42,869 100 178,000 
Remittances 30 4,050 9,005 150 43,000 
Net crop sale 413 99,009 709,300 30 10,200,000 
Net livestock and livestock Product sale 247 146,032 1,420,288 100 21,400,000 
Pension 266 12,350 8,175 1,000 66,000 
Savings 26 13,626 12,792 750 40,000 
Sale of assets for farming 6 29,400 35,423 2,000 90,000 
Sale of nonfarming assets  3 2,000   --- --- --- 
Government or other grants (child grant, 
disability) 
39 5,403 3,488 130 18,000 
Total from above sources 674 128,200 1,116,143 51 25,100,00 
Imputed labor income 749 1,133 2,768 6.6 41,990 
Total income* 749 116,090 1,060,024 10 25,000,000 
Total income) 749 9.627 1.879 2.3 17.0 
Source: Author’s Calculations from Food and Water Security under Global Change: Developing Adaptive Capacity with a Focus 
on Rural Africa 
Note: *Total income was computed adding totals from “Gifts” through “Grants” to either “Total nonfarm net income” (which had 





The variable farm value was often missing. The Amelia logarithm was again used to impute 
missing values for farm value, using information on plot size, use of plot (crops, livestock, garden), type 
of soil, slope, erosion status, type of irrigation, and land tenure. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
Rainfall information was constructed from a set of climate grids called CRU TS 2.1, as described in 
Mitchell and Jones (2005). The mean and coefficient of variation (CV) of rainfall were first calculated for 
half degree latitude/longitude grid cells, and then interpolated to household sites based on their locations. 
Table 5. Farm characteristics 
Variable Mean Min* Max** Standard 
Deviation 
Obs.*** 
Years in farming 12.5 1 60 11.7 741 
Value of farm land (in S.A. Rand) 64,7179 540 15,000,000 1,088,400 727 
Rainfall (October 2004-April 2005) (mm) 370.2 265.7 463.5 54.1 749 
Seasonal (October – April)  mean of rainfall 1951-2000 (mm) 561.4 260.1 813.8 94.3 749 
Seasonal (October-April) coefficient of variation of rainfall 
1951-2000  
0.244 .0176 0.451 0.0393 749 
Distance of household to market (km) 51.19 0 600 72.89 749 
Distance of household to primary school (km) 3.05 0.01 50 4.96 716 
Note: The abbreviations stand for the following, respectively: * Min = minimum; **Max=maximum; and Obs. =observations.  
While the data are cross-sectional and, ideally, questions about vulnerability could be answered 
with panel data (Dercon et al. 2005, Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003), the assumption is that cross-
sectional variation mimics intertemporal variation, thus mirroring the approach of Tesliuc and Lindert 
(2002). Certain types of assets and farm value are used as predetermined variables to examine the effect 
on income of droughts in 2005. This is further discussed in the next section on the impact of shocks. 
Description and Structure of Shocks 
Data were gathered on 27 types of shocks, with an additional category for reporting “other.” The shocks 
were pre-coded as one of the following: drought, flood, hailstorm, fire outbreak, landslide, pests of crops 
before harvest, crop loss during storage, animal disease, large increase in input prices, large decline in 
output prices, inability to sell agricultural products, inability to sell nonagricultural products, land 
distribution by government, forced migration, discrimination for political reasons, discrimination for 
social reasons, forced contributions or arbitrary taxation, destruction or theft of tools or inputs for 
production, theft of crops, theft of livestock, other theft, loss of job by family member, death of family 
member, illness of family member, separation of family member(s), dispute with extended family, dispute 
with others in village and other. The percentage of households reporting the various shocks can be seen in 
Table 6. Shocks were reported as far back as 1977, but the question specifically asked for shocks from the 
last five years, so all shocks occurring before 2001 were deemed unreliable and highly subject to recall 
bias. 
Table 6. Description of self-reported shocks 







shock in 2004 
Percentage of 
households reporting 
shock between  
2001 and 2005 





To examine the potential for recall bias in self-reported shocks, two variables⎯mean and 
coefficient of variation (CV) ⎯were used to measure the historical intensity and frequency of drought 
events over the time range of 1951-2000, and information about the October 2004 to April 2005 growing 
season was also considered. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of rainfall divided by 
mean. As can be seen in Table 5, 2004-05 was a drier year than the 1951-2000 average. Mean of rainfall 
and CV were first calculated for half degree latitude/longitude grid cells, and then interpolated to 
household sites based on their locations (latitudes and longitudes). In addition to this information about 
the distribution of historical rainfall, information specifically for the 2004-2005 growing season from 
October to April was used. As can be seen in Table 7, the relationship between self-reported droughts and 
floods and rainfall data is weak. Even after standardizing rainfall data and examining deviations from the 
mean, the correlations are very low. 
Flood 0.9 1.3 7.9 
Hailstorm 0.5 3.6 8.9 
Landslide 4.4 3.3 10.5 
Pests of crops before harvest 0 0 0.0 
Crop loss during storage 1.9 2.7 7.7 
Animal disease 0.3 0.3 0.9 
Large increase in input prices 1.5 1.1 5.7 
Large decline in output prices 0.1 0.9 1.6 
Inability to sell agricultural products 0.1 1.1 1.7 
Inability to sell nonagricultural products 0.5 1.3 7.3 
Land distribution by government 0.1 0 0.5 
Forced migration 0 0.1 0.1 
Discrimination for political reasons 0 0 0 
Discrimination for social reasons 0.3 0.1 0.8 
Forced contributions or arbitrary taxation 0.1 0 0.3 
Destruction or theft of tools or inputs for 
production 
0 0.3 0.4 
Theft of crops 0.8 0.9 3.6 
Theft of livestock 1.6 1.6 4.7 
Other theft 1.2 0.7 3.6 
Loss of job by family member 0.4 1.2 2.0 
Death of family member 0 0.1 0.8 
Illness of family member 1.2 1.2 6.1 
Separation of family member 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Dispute with extended family 0 0 0.1 
Dispute with others in village 0.3 0 0.4 



































Self-reported drought 2005 1      
Self-reported flood 2005 0.1047 1     
Rainfall (October 2004-April 
2005) (mm) 0.0737 -0.0451 1    
Seasonal (October – April) mean 
of  rainfall 1951 – 2000 (mm) -0.0022 -0.0312 0.4472 1   
Seasonal (October-April) 
coefficient of variation of rainfall 
1951-2000  
-0.0941 0.0347 -0.5649 -0.4367 1  
Standard deviations of October 
2004– April 2005 (Rainfall from 
Historical Mean) 
0.0125 0.0119 0.1224 -0.7665 0.401 1 
Self-reported droughts and floods were reported as zero-one variables, while rainfall was reported in millimeters, and the 
coefficient of variation was unit-less. Standard deviations of rainfall from historical mean ranged from -2.54 to 1.25 mm. 
Figure 33a and 3b presents kernel densities of households reporting shocks and households not 
reporting shocks. No apparent relationship appears between those who reported droughts and those who 
would have been expected to report droughts from the rainfall data. The relationship on floods is more 
difficult to see since only seven floods were reported in 2005. One reason for this is that the hydrological 
data is an average over the entire growing season; hence, it may not capture a run of rainless days. In 
addition, because the rainfall data were extrapolated from rainfall data stations, it is by construction 
spatially correlated and may be missing important microclimate dynamics. Faced with the choice of using 
potentially biased self-reported shocks and potentially unrelated climate data, the potentially biased self-
reported shocks are used since they more accurately capture the variation. Using shocks from the past 
year should limit the extent of recall bias problems and provide more valuable information about 
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Floods   
The frequency over the last five years of the most relevant climate change shocks, as well as their 
outcomes, is reported in Figures 3a and 3b. The figure shows that droughts were the most prevalent type 
of shock. Forty-one instances of drought and seven floods were reported in 2005. The year of the survey, 
2005, was a relatively normal year for South Africa: The currency crisis of 2001 had faded, and the South 
African currency—the Rand—was holding steady at a little over 6 Rand to the dollar. There were some 
minor labor strikes, and there were some earthquakes west of Johannesburg, but 2005 was not otherwise 
an abnormal year for macroeconomic volatility or natural disasters.  
Coping Strategies 
When a household is hit by a shock, its coping strategies are an important indication of adaptation and 
vulnerability. The vast majority, 75 percent of respondents, said that they did nothing in response to the 
shock. Other responses included coping strategies such as selling livestock, borrowing from relatives or 
the bank, receiving aid, migrating to another rural or an urban area, seeking off-farm employment or 
eating less. That there were so many respondents reporting they “did nothing” is puzzling: At the very 
least, a household is likely to have dug into its assets or reduced consumption. It may be that households 
are reporting many types of droughts, and not just the ones having the most impact. This means that the 
results will be biased towards thinking there is less of an impact from droughts and floods than more. This 
could also reflect that households have already adapted to living in a drought-prone environment. 
Households may be using drought-resistant varieties or other coping mechanisms that minimize the cost 





Table 8. Actions resulting from shocks that occurred from 2001 to 2005 
Action Frequency of actions resulting from a: 
Drought Flood 
 2005 2001-05 2005 2001-05 
Did nothing 34 366 6 43 
Sold livestock 1 19 0 1 
Borrowed from relatives 1 3 0 2 
Borrowed from bank 1 7 0 0 
Received food aid 0 1 0 0 
Migrated 1 4 0 0 
Ate less 0 2 0 0 
Other 9 30 2 5 
Not specified 0 20 0 6 
Total 47 452 8 57 
Source: Author’s Calculation from Food and Water Security under Global Change: Developing Adaptive Capacity with a Focus 
on Rural Africa 






3.  IMPACT OF SHOCKS 
Propensity score matching provides a way to estimate the impact of a drought, despite droughts not being 
randomized across groups. Simply comparing the income between shocked and un-shocked households 
would lead to a biased estimate of the impact of droughts because of covariates correlated with both the 
probability of receiving a drought and income. Ideally, households with the same set of covariates could 
be compared across drought and no-drought status to estimate the impact. Implementing this would be 
next to impossible because of dimensionality problems, so propensity score matching is used. 
Households’ characteristics are used to estimate the probability of receiving a drought (the propensity 
score). Next, income of households with similar probabilities is compared to estimate the impact of 
droughts. (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Dehejia and Wahba 2002). Here a logistic regression is run to 
estimate the probability of a drought, given household characteristics. Since only cross-sectional data are 
available, it is essential that the propensity score reflects only pre-determined variables, those that have 
not been impacted by the drought. Therefore, droughts that occurred in the last four months are used, and 
assets that are difficult to sell and time-invariant characteristics are used.  
In the income section of the survey, households were asked if they sold farming or nonfarming 
equipment from 2004 to 2005. These results can be seen in Table 4. Only three households reported 
selling nonfarming equipment, and none of those households reported a drought in 2005. Six households 
reported selling farming equipment; none of these reported a shock either. This evidence, combined with 
the conservative choice of assets, means that the control variables are pre-determined and unaffected by a 
drought from the last four months. Even with the assurance that the covariates are all pre-shock variables, 
propensity score matching is only reliable if all the important covariates are captured in the propensity 
score and the same approach is used as in Tesliuc and Lindert (2002).  
Logistic Descriptions of Shocks 
To understand the impact of droughts on income, the first step is estimating the probability of 
experiencing a shock, given household characteristics. For this reason, a logistic regression is run to 
estimate the probability of experiencing a drought as a function of household characteristics:  
 ( ) ( )P shock f X=  (1) 
Here f is the exponential probability density function; X is a vector of household variables listed 
in Table 9 and shock refers only to droughts, because drought was the only shock with enough variation 
to study. The type of farm refers to small-scale farming versus large-scale farming, with a 0 for a small-
scale farm, and a 1 indicating a large-scale farm. Since it was not clear in the survey which member of the 
household was the household head, the educational variables—“Years of education” and “Years of 
education squared”—refer to the number of years of education of the most educated member of the 
family. Three variables related to rainfall were included to capture important aspects of the quantity and 
distribution of rainfall. The coefficient of variation (CV) for 2004-2005 annual rainfall was included to 
capture the intra-year rainfall variation, while the CV for 1951-2000 was included to capture inter-year 
variation. The mean of historical rainfall (1951-2000) was included to capture whether the area was on 
average relatively dry or wet. Distance to a primary or secondary school, and distance to market were 
included to pick up variation in distance to village center, and variables on assets and district dummies 





Table 9. Logistic regression on drought 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P-value 
Years in farming 0.00823 0.0111 0.457 
Type of farm (0= small-scale, 1= large-scale) 0.626 0.419 0.135 
Years of education 0.338*** 0.0977 0.001 
Years of education squared -0.0176*** 0.00523 0.001 
Value of farm land 1.5E-07 1.27E-07 0.236 
CV of 2004-05 annual rainfall  68.1** 31 0.028 
CV of 1951-2000 growing season rainfall -58.8** 24.8 0.018 
Mean of 1951-00 growing season rainfall -0.00367 0.00444 0.409 
Distance to school (km) -0.0478** 0.0238 0.044 
Distance to market (km) 0.00103 0.00175 0.556 
Does the household own a car? -0.0109 0.278 0.969 
Does the household own a pump? 0.0344 0.111 0.757 
Does the household own a sprinkler system? 0.259 0.344 0.452 
Does the household own a flush toilet? -0.109 0.344 0.752 
Does the household own a concrete house? 0.526 0.331 0.112 
Does the household own a refrigerator?  0.0121 0.187 0.948 
Does the household have formal title to its land? -2.5E-05 0.000328 0.939 
Does the household have access to electricity? 0.0776 0.33 0.814 
District dummies    
 Cullinan -0.602 1.29 0.64 
 Carolina -0.225 1.09 0.836 
 Lydenburg 2.1** 1.04 0.042 
 Middelburg 0.766 0.727 0.292 
 Nkomazi -0.701 1.25 0.576 
 Witrivier -1.17 1.23 0.341 
 Brits -1.41 0.862 0.102 
 Marico -2.11** 0.879 0.017 
 Rustenburg -0.191 0.739 0.797 
 Lephalale (Ellisras) -3.41*** 0.969 0.000 
 Tzaneen (Letaba) -0.151 1.05 0.886 
 Messina -1.14 0.938 0.222 
 Nebo 0.0199 0.661 0.976 
 Makpopane (Potgietersrus)  -2.35** 0.917 0.010 
 Soutpansberg -2.32** 0.944 0.014 
 Thabazimbi -3.46*** 1.22 0.005 
 Thohoyandou -1.88 1.16 0.104 
 Warmbad (Bela-Bela) -2** 0.84 0.018 
Constant -1.33 -1.23 4.39 
Pseudo R2 0.1659 
   Number of observations 647 
Note: * Indicates significance at a 10% level; ** indicates significance at a 5% level; and *** indicates significance at a 1% 





Rainfall variability as measured by CV was an important predictor of drought. Intra-year 
variability increased the probability of a drought, while inter-year variability decreased the probability 
that a drought was reported. The coefficients on these variables and the coefficient on historical means of 
rainfall were unstable; when one was excluded, the others were not significant. Both inter- and intra-
variability should increase the probability of a drought, since a larger variance increases the probability of 
being in the tails of a distribution. However, the negative coefficient on inter-year variability indicates 
that the perception of drought occurrence decreases if a farmer is used to large inter-year variability. 
While using three variables on rainfall may seem excessive, the three values capture different aspects of 
the distribution of rainfall. The loss of precision due to multi-co linearity is made up for by the reduction 
in bias by omitting one of the three variables. Three of the district dummies were significant, indicating 
that droughts are a spatially correlated, covariate risk.  
Years of education, and years of education squared are significant predictors of the probability of 
a drought. Since these logistic regressions are later used in estimating the impact of droughts on income, 
understanding the importance of education in relation to the probability of experiencing a drought is 
important. There are three possible explanations for why this relationship matters. First, more educated 
people may simply report more droughts. Second, education could be picking up spatial clustering within 
districts. Third, people may invest more in education in response to droughts, which could yield higher 
returns in nonfarm activities. If educated people are reporting more droughts, it would help explain the 
relatively low correlation between reported droughts and actual rainfall behavior noted in Table 7 and 
Figure 33a and 3b, but also lead to a problem of self-reporting bias. Self-reporting bias would lead to 
reporting of the most noteworthy and harmful droughts, exaggerating the impact of droughts on income. 
Because the results end up being insignificant, self-reporting bias is not a problem in this analysis. The 
second explanation, that education is accounting for spatial clustering, is also not a problem for the 
analysis.  
If education is acting as a proxy for other exogenous, unobserved characteristics such as spatial 
clustering, it only makes the propensity score estimates in the following section more robust. However, if 
the third explanation alluded to is correct, and people are responding to droughts by acquiring more 
education, then there is an endogenous problem that must be examined. One way to test for this is to see 
whether or not education is correlated with rainfall variables other than self-reported droughts. As can be 
seen in Table, this is clearly not the case. The correlation between rainfall levels is positive and the 
correlation between CV and education is negative, suggesting that the population is more educated in less 
drought-prone environments. This suggests reasons 1 and 2 above do a better job explaining the 
relationship than does reason 3. Furthermore, it suggests that individuals in households are not acquiring 
more education in response to droughts. 























Education 1.0000     
October–April rainfall 1951–2000 (mm) 0.1911   1.0000    
Coefficient of Variation for October–
April rainfall 1951–2000 
-0.1407  -0.4370   1.0000   
Rainfall October 2004–April 2005 (mm) 0.1787   0.9919  -0.3683    1.0000  
Coefficient of Variation October 2004–
April 2005 





Propensity Score Matching Results 
The logistic regression presented in Table 9 is used to obtain the probability of experiencing a drought; 
that is to say, the propensity score. Observations that have a propensity score within a bandwidth of 0.001 
are compared using an Epanechnikov kernel to estimate the difference between current and counterfactual 
income. Standard errors are derived by bootstrapping 1,000 times to obtain the standard errors and p-
values that are reported in Table 11. Neither of the impacts is significant; in fact, they are both positive. 
This could be because of problems with the data; the income variable, in particular, may not be capturing 
enough variation after all the imputations were performed. Another explanation could be that the 
propensity score did not accurately capture the probability of experiencing a drought (the R2 from the 
logistic regressions was 0.17). Lastly, the impact of shocks may be insignificant because households have 
adapted to droughts. This last explanation is especially compelling in light of the responses shown in 
Table 8 in which 34 out of 47 respondents said they “did nothing” to cope with a drought. Droughts are 
common in South Africa, and households may already have coping mechanisms (such as off-farm labor 
sources, drought-tolerant farming practices, informal sharing of resources, and so on) in place to deal with 
their occurrence. While individual droughts do not appear to have a significant impact on income, this 
does not mean the presence of droughts does not impact income. Frequent droughts would be reflected in 
lower land values, which could be analyzed through a hedonic analysis.  
Table 11. Effect of drought on income within the last 16 and last 4 months 











Propensity score matching on drought in last 16 months 
Households that received a shock in 
last 16 months 
447,805 94,376 0 112 
Households that received no shock 
in last 16 months 
60,294 52,153 24 534 
Difference  42,223 P-value 0.713 
Propensity score matching on drought in last 4 months 
Households that received shock in 
last 4 months 
797,582 69,606 11 23 
Households that received no shock 
in last 4 months 
88,713 48,954 0 636 





4.  ESTIMATION OF VULNERABILITY 
Thus far this paper has described the sources of vulnerability in the Limpopo Basin, and provided an 
estimate of the loss to income from the droughts reported in 2005.  The final goal is to quantify who is 
likely to be vulnerable in the future and to identify household characteristics that indicate vulnerability. 
Recall that vulnerability is the probability of becoming poor or falling below some income threshold 
during some future time span. The threshold in this case is defined as those with an income of less than 
7,800 Rand, which corresponds to being in the bottom 25 percent of household income in the sample. A 
second threshold of median household income of 16,000 Rand is also used. Vulnerability is the 
probability that the household will fall below this threshold in the next time period.  
Vulnerability is estimated following Tesliuc and Lindert’s application of Chaudhuri (2000). First, 
income is written as a function of household characteristics and shocks, Xh , and a disturbance term, eh : 
 hhh eXI += β)ln(  (2) 
The error term, he  has a variance of σ e,h
2 = X hθ . Only shocks from 2005 are used. The 
estimation of θ and β follows a three-stage least squares framework. First, hhh eXI += β)ln(  is 
estimated and the residuals are saved in order to obtain θ from σ e,h










where uh = eh X hθ , a standard N(0,1) error term. Thus, vulnerability can be calculated as: 
 





where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and z is the income threshold.  
The results are plotted in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The x-axis shows the observed and imputed 
values for the natural log of income, while the y-axis shows the computed estimates of vulnerability. The 
graph is broken up into four sections. Those in the upper left are poor today and likely to be poor 
tomorrow, and those in the bottom left are poor today, but have characteristics suggesting they have a less 
than 50 percent chance of being poor in the future. Those in the upper right corner are not below the 
income threshold at present, but are likely to become so in the future, while those in the bottom left are 
above the income threshold and are likely to remain above it in the future. In Figure 5 the results show 
that most households are not vulnerable to having their income fall below 7,800 Rand. However, if the 
poverty line is increased to 16,000 Rand (the second income quartile), vulnerability increases, as is shown 
in Figure 6. This analysis can be used to explore other dimensions of poverty. These results are 
summarized in Table 12 and in the figures shown in the Appendix. Figures 1-7 in the Appendix were 
made by dividing up those in various groups and plotting against the whole, examining those that have 
and do not have access to credit, those households that own animals and those that do not, those 
households that use irrigation and those that are only use rainfed agriculture, as well as households by size 





Figure 5. Vulnerability (income < 7,800 R) plotted against Ln (income)  
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Note: Vulnerability is defined here as the probability of household income falling to less than 7,800 Rand. 
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Table 12 can be used to identify household characteristics that signal vulnerability. Many of the 
associations in Table 12 are not surprising; households that have characteristics associated with being 
poor are also households that are generally vulnerable. Households that have obtained loans are more 
vulnerable than households that did not obtain a loan because they did not want one or those households 
that could not obtain a loan. Households that do not own farm animals are more vulnerable, as were 
households that rely on rainfed agriculture. Larger households and households with lower income are also 
more vulnerable. Gauteng is the most vulnerable province when it comes to the lowest threshold level 
(7,800 Rand) but not when it comes to falling below 16,000 Rand. For the second vulnerability measure, 
residents of North West province are most vulnerable, but it should be noted the differences are minimal 
and not statistically significant. Residents of Limpopo are the least vulnerable. Members of the SeSwati 
and Setswana ethnic groups are the most and second most vulnerable groups to poverty no matter the 
threshold level. This method of examining vulnerability by household characteristics was done by Ligon 
and Schechter (2003) and Tesliuc and Lindert (2002). 
Table 12. Vulnerability by household characteristic at income levels below 7,800 R and below 16,000 R 









 <7,800 R  <16,000 R   
Residents of Gauteng  0.361 0.211 0.573 0.282 37 
Residents of Mpumalanga 0.310 0.191 0.542 0.220 167 
Residents of North West 0.336 0.223 0.577 0.210 90 
Residents of Limpopo 0.231 0.144 0.467 0.173 377 
Ethnicity: Zulu 0.177 0.108 0.393 0.167 12 
 Xhosa 0.252 0.132 0.489 0.198 18 
 Tshivenda 0.218 0.162 0.428 0.227 114 
 Southern Sotho 0.250 0.137 0.488 0.193 11 
 Tsonga 0.223 0.131 0.458 0.154 67 
 Setswana 0.286 0.164 0.526 0.197 129 
 SeSwati 0.429 0.207 0.663 0.215 67 
 SePedi 0.259 0.110 0.511 0.138 177 
 Ndebele 0.279 0.219 0.489 0.262 46 
 English 0.383 0.199 0.638 0.167 4 
 Afrikaans 0.288 0.144 0.533 0.194 19 
 Other 0.047 -- 0.170 -- 1 
Households that obtained a loan 0.297 0.196 0.526 0.221 148 
Households that did not obtain a loan because they did not have 
access to credit or knowledge about credit 
0.259 0.143 0.497 0.188 185 
Households that did not want a loan 0.266 0.155 0.501 0.198 167 
Households that own livestock, poultry, fish or other farm animals 0.258 0.151 0.495 0.188 284 
Households that do not own livestock, poultry, fish or other farm 
animals 
0.327 0.197 0.560 0.225 204 
Households that use irrigation 0.272 0.174 0.503 0.209 461 
Households that use only rainfed agriculture 0.277 0.145 0.522 0.172 191 
Small households (≤5 members) 0.275 0.166 0.511 0.198 290 
Medium households (5<members≤10) 0.263 0.162 0.497 0.199 309 
Large households (>10 members) 0.299 0.195 0.527 0.233 72 





5.  CONCLUSION 
The estimates of the impact of shocks on income were not statistically significant; one of the reasons for 
this could have been the quality of the data. A more compelling explanation is that households have 
already adjusted to living in a drought-prone environment and developed income smoothing methods. A 
major piece of evidence pointing in this direction is that so many households said they “did nothing” in 
response to droughts. This does not necessarily mean that households are prepared for climate change. 
Climate change is expected to bring a different distribution of shocks, as well as adaptive behavior to 
mitigate against the shocks, both of which could be costly to those least able to bear the cost. The impact 
of a changing distribution of droughts and, hence, more costly risk coping devices, remains to be studied. 
The different distributions of rainfall were partially addressed with the inclusion of mean and CV rainfall 
data, but could be further studied with better data and higher order moments of rainfall distribution. If 
South Africa had a vibrant land market such that land prices could be observed, a hedonic study such as 
that by Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) could be done with enough data and enough attention paid to 
higher order moments of rainfall distribution. While first and second moments may be appropriate for 
studying agriculture in economies with irrigation and risk mitigation strategies, they are not appropriate 
for developing economies. Predicting the actual effects of climate change is fraught with difficulties due 
to the high levels of uncertainty, but that does not mean information about behavior today cannot be used 
to guide predictions of what will happen tomorrow. 
The vulnerability breakdowns can help policymakers identify households that are not poor 
currently, but have a high probability of becoming poor in the future. Households that do not own 
livestock are typically vulnerable, as are large households. Residents of Limpopo Province were least 
vulnerable, while members of the SeSwati ethnic group were most vulnerable. While panel data would be 
preferred for vulnerability analysis, cross-sectional data were used. Given that climate change will 






APPENDIX. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
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Note: This graph describes how imputing values of income changes the overall distribution of the natural logarithm of income.  
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Figure A.11. Plot of vulnerability (income below 7,800 Rand) access to credit 
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